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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In the underlying action, Plaintiff seeks relief against Defendant Fairfield to obtain a
deficiency judgment subsequent to a nonjudicial foreclosure sale which occurred on
November 25, 2009, as against the guarantors of a promissory note and deed of trust which was
the subject of the above referenced nonjudicial foreclosure.
On or about February 26, 2008, Plaintiff, at the request of Defendants and an entity
known as New Meadows Community Development, LLC, entered into a loan agreement
whereby Plaintiff loaned New Meadows Community Development, LLC the principal sum of
$679,000.00. In consideration of this loan, New Meadows Community Development, LLC
executed and delivered to Plaintiff a promissory note in the principal sum of $679,000.00,
together with interest thereon at the rate set forth in said promissory note (hereinafter referred to
as "Note").
To secure said payment of said Note, New Meadows Development, LLC granted,
executed and delivered to Plaintiff a Deed of Trust which granted a security interest in that
parcel of real property located in Valley County, Idaho, and more particularly described as
follows:
Lots 1, 2 and 3 of Block 22, Townsite of New Meadows, as said lots and block are
numbered and designated on the official plat thereof on file in the Adams County,
Recorder's Office.
Also described as Units 1, 2, 5, 6, 7 and 8, together with common areas and
parking, Below the 45 th Condominiums, as said units are numbered and shown on
the official plat thereof on file and of record in the County Recorder's office,
Adams County, Idaho, recorded September 5, 2007 as Instr. No. 115144 in Book 3
of Plats page 23.

1

Excepting Therefrom:
Unit 3 and Unit 4, below the 45 th Condominiums, as said units are numbered and
shown on the official plat thereof on file and of record in the County Recorder's
office, Adams County, Idaho recorded September 5, 2007 as Instr. No. 115144 in
Book 3 of Plats ·page 23.
Said Deed of Trust was thereafter recorded in the records of Adams County, Idaho on
March 20, 2006 as Instrument No. 111335.
Pursuant to the loan agreement, Defendant Fairfield executed a written commercial
guaranty wherein Defendant Fairfield guaranteed full and punctual payment by New Meadows
Community Development, LLC under the terms of the Note.
Ultimately, New Meadows Community Development, LLC and Defendant Fairfield
failed to pay the Note when due under the terms by failing to pay monthly payments required
therein. Thereafter, Plaintiff proceeded with a nonjudicial foreclosure of the Deed of Trust and
a foreclosure sale of the Deed of Trust was conducted on November 25, 2009.

At the

foreclosure sale, Plaintiff purchased the real property which was the subject of the Deed of
Trust with a credit bid of $313,064.30.
On November 12, 2012, Plaintiff initiated suit against Defendant Fairfield and the rest
of the guarantor Defendants.

Defendant Fairfield, by and through his counsel of record,

Robert A. Bartlett, filed an answer to Plaintiffs complaint on February 10, 2011. On May 9,
2011, Plaintiff filed and served a motion for summary judgment. In support of the motion for
summary judgment, Plaintiff also filed and served the Affidavit of Jason Delp, Plaintiffs
Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, and a Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion
for Summary Judgment.

2

The hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment was continued several times and
ultimately was set to be heard on March 8, 2012-approximately 10 months after the date the
original motion for summary judgment was filed.

During this lengthy period of time,

Defendant Fairfield did not file any material in opposition to Plaintiffs motion for summary
judgment. Then, on February 22, 2012, Attorney Robert Bartlett filed an Affidavit in Support
of a Motion to Continue Hearing. On February 29, 2012, Plaintiff filed an objection to the
Motion to Continue. This Objection detailed the history related to the various continuances of
the hearing on the motion for summary judgment.
A telephonic hearing was held on March 8, 2012. Neither Defendant Fairfield nor his
counsel, Robert A. Bartlett attended the telephonic hearing. After considering Mr. Bartlett's
Affidavit in Support of Motion to Continue Hearing, the District Court found that good cause
did not exist to continue the hearing on Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment and ultimately
granted Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY GRANTED BY
THE DISTRICT COURT.
A.

PLAINTIFF PROVIDED SUFFICIENT NOTICE AND EVIDENT/ARY
SUPPORT FOR THE AMOUNT OF THE DEFICIENCY WHICH WAS
ULTIMATELY AWARDED PURSUANT TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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In his brief and without citing any authority or making any reference to the record before
this Court, Defendant Fairfield claims that Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment should not
have been granted because the "Plaintiff failed in its pleadings to give sufficient notice of the
amount of the deficiency, and the manner in which the deficiency was calculated .... " Def.
Fairfield App. Br., p. 1.
As this Court will note from the record, Defendant Fairfield's argument is simply
unsupported and without merit. For example, Plaintiffs complaint provides detail of the history
of the underlying transaction.

The complaint identifies that at the time of the nonjudicial

foreclosure which occurred on November 25, 2009, the amount of the indebtedness due included
the unpaid principal amount of $469,239.53, accrued interest in the sum of $34,129.88 to
November 25, 2009, late charges in the sum of $1,520.96, reconveyance fees in the sum of
$65.00, attorney's fees and nonsufficient fund fees in the amount of $3,605.00 for a total due and
owing of $508,560.37 as of November 25, 2009. R. Vol. 1, p. 7, LL. 12-18. The complaint also
identifies that Plaintiff provided a credit bid at the nonjudicial foreclosure sale in the amount of
$313,064.30 to purchase the subject property. R. Vol. 1, p. 7, LL. 8-9. Further, the complaint
identifies that the entire amount of the indebtedness due, after the credit bid at the November 25,
2012 foreclosure sale, was the unpaid principal amount of $195,496.07, accrued assessed interest
in the sum of $13,280.34 from November 25, 2009 to November 2, 2010 on the unpaid principal
amount at the Note rate of 7.25% ($38.83 per diem multiplied by 342 days) with interest
continuing to accrue at the Note rate of 7.25% ($38.83 per diem) until the date of judgment. R.
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Vol. 1, p. 7, LL. 20-28. This same balance due and owing was again referenced in the portion of
the complaint which contained the prayer for relief. R. Vol. 1, p. 8, LL. 2-15.
Thereafter, Plaintiff filed and served its motion for summary judgment on May 9, 2011.
Similar to the complaint, Plaintiffs motion identified the unpaid principal balance due and owing
as of April 8, 2011 included the unpaid principal amount of $195,496.07, and that total accrued
interest as of April 8, 2011 was the sum of $19,376.65 and that interest would continue to accrue
at the rate of $33.83 per day until the date of judgment. R. Vol. 1, p. 17, LL. 6-11. Filed
concurrently with this motion, Plaintiff filed and served the Affidavit of Jason Delp which
provided sworn testimony that detailed the transaction history and which identified that the
unpaid principal sum of $195,496.07 was due and owing after the credit bid at the nonjudicial
foreclosure sale, and that interest in the amount of $19,376.65 was due through April 8, 2011,and
that interest would continue to accrue thereafter at the rate of 7.25% per annum or $38.83 per
day until the date of judgment. R. Vol. 1, p. 22, LL. 6-10. Additionally, Plaintiff filed and
served a memorandum in support of Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment which similarly
identified this amount as being due and owing. R. Vol. 1, p. 65, LL. 2-17. Plaintiff filed and
served Plaintiffs statement of undisputed material facts which identified the same transaction
history and this same amount as being due and owing. R. Vol. 1, pp. 57-60. Based upon the
foregoing, Defendant Fairfield was given ample "notice" of not only the entire transaction
history, but also the resulting unpaid debt at issue at multiple times during this proceeding.
Ultimately, at the summary judgment hearing, the court was presented with undisputed evidence
of this debt via the Affidavit of Jason Delp since Defendant Fairfield failed to produce any
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evidence to dispute the balance due and owing as claimed by Jason Delp under oath. Idaho Rule
of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides, in pertinent part:
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.

In this case, the court was required pursuant to I.R.C.P. 56(c) to grant Plaintiff's motion for
summary judgment and the resulting judgment therefrom, due to the fact that Defendant Fairfield
had failed to present any evidence disputing the testimony of Jason Delp regarding the balance
due and owing.
In considering this appeal, this Court is to employ the same standards in reviewing an
order for summary judgment as the district court used when it originally ruled on the motion.
Van v. Portneuf Med. Ctr., 149 Idaho 552, 556, 212 P.3d 982, 986 (2009). When a matter, like

the case at hand, would be tried to the district court, and not to a jury, the court, as trier of fact,
"is entitled to arrive at the most probable inferences based upon the undisputed evidence
properly before it and grant the summary judgment despite the possibility of conflicting
inferences." P.O. Ventures, Inc. v. Loucks Family Irrevocable Trust, 144 Idaho 233,237, 159 P.
3d. 870, 874 (2007). So, although conflicting evidence must be viewed in a light favorable to the
nonmoving party, conflicting inferences need not be. Banner Life Ins. Co. v. Mark Wallace
Dixson Irrevocable Trust, 147 Idaho 117, 124, 206 P.3d 481, 488 (2009). The appellate court

exercises free review over the record before it to determine whether the district court's inferences
are supported, and to determine whether either side is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
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P.O. Ventures, Inc., 144 Idaho at 237, 159 P.3d at 874. At summary judgment, when reasonable
minds can come to but one conclusion on an issue of fact, a judge may decide the issue as a
matter of law. Mickelson v. Broadway Ford, Inc., 153 Idaho 149, 280 P.3d 176 (2012). A
failure of the nonmoving party to come forward and produce evidence by affidavit or as
otherwise provided in the rules to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial, precluding summary judgment, will result in an order granting summary judgment.

Levinger v. Mercy Med. Ctr., 139 Idaho 192, 75 P.3d 1202 (2003) reh'g denied.
In this case, no conflicting evidence was produced by Defendant Fairfield in opposition

to Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment. Ultimately, the district court could only come to
one conclusion based upon the undisputed evidence presented via the affidavit of Jason Delp and
grant Plaintiffs motion. Equally, when this Court considers the same undisputed evidence in this
case that the district court considered, this Court must also come to the inescapable conclusion
that Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment was properly granted due to a complete absence of
undisputed material facts.

B.

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
DENYING

DEFENDANT

FAIRFIELD'S

REQUEST

FOR

A

CONTINUANCE OF THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT HEARING.
In this case, Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment had been filed originally on May 9,

2011. The hearing on the motion had been continued and was ultimately scheduled to be heard
on March 8, 2012.
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During this time, Defendant Fairfield had roughly 10 months to complete any discovery
needed in the case and to produce any affidavits or deposition testimony which he felt might
contradict the testimony contained in the Affidavit of Jason Delp.
As the summary judgment hearing approached, instead of filing a response, on
February 22, 2012, Attorney Robert Bartlett filed an affidavit in support of motion to continue
hearing. R. Vol. 1, pp. 66-68. A motion to continue the hearing was not filed with the court.
On February 29, 2012, Plaintiff filed an objection to Defendant Fairfield's motion to continue
which detailed the history of the various extensions related to the summary judgment hearing and
the issue why "good cause" did not exist to continue the hearing. R. Vol. 1, pp. 69-73. For
example, as the previously scheduled December 7, 2011 hearing on the summary judgment
approached, Plaintiffs counsel and Mr. Bartlett spoke about continuing the subject hearing due
to the tragedy which Mr. Bartlett experienced and the need he had for more time to prepare a
response to the motion. Accordingly, on November 8, 2011, Plaintiff filed an amended notice of
hearing essentially continuing the hearing until March 8, 2012 to provide further time for

Mr. Bartlett. R. Vol. 1, p. 70, LL. 14-22.
After this continuance, roughly three months passed without further activity on the part of

Mr. Bartlett in this case. In mid-February 2012, Mr. Bartlett contacted Plaintiffs counsel and
requested another continuance and indicated that he had lost his file.

To expedite matters,

Plaintiff's counsel agreed to copy the entire file and provide Mr. Bartlett with a copy. R. Vol. 1,
p. 70, LL. 23-28.
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The affidavit in support of the motion for continuance detailed the horrible tragedy which
befell Mr. Bartlett in October 2011, and in the affidavit, Mr. Bartlett stated "I have spent the last
four (4) months trying to put my life back together, and although I agreed to continue the hearing
until March 8, 2012, thinking it would be enough time to move forward, it has not been sufficient
time for me to prepare for the hearing." R. Vol. 1, p. 67, LL. 4-7.
However, in its objection, Plaintiff pointed out that Defendant Fairfield had had in excess
of nine months to respond to the summary judgment motion and present admissible evidence
contesting the facts presented via the Affidavit of Jason Delp. R. Vol. 1, p. 71, LL. 1-6. Further,
in its objection, Plaintiff also pointed out that pursuant to Rule 1.16(a)(2) of the Idaho Rules of
Professional Conduct, Mr. Bartlett should have immediately withdrawn from representing
Defendant Fairfield and substitute counsel should have intervened if Mr. Barlett's physical or
mental condition materially impaired his ability to represent his client. R. Vol. 1, p. 72, LL. 1620. The objection also pointed out that Mr. Bartlett elected not to withdraw-essentially taking
the position at the time of the prior continuance in November 2011 that he was capable of
moving forward with Mr. Fairfield's defense. R. Vol. 1, p. 72, LL. 20-22. The objection further
noted that Plaintiff should not be prejudiced based upon a claim that Mr. Bartlett had not been
"fit" to respond, when it was Mr. Bartlett's responsibility to withdraw from the case. R. Vol. 1,
p. 72., LL. 22-26.
Ultimately, the summary judgment hearing was held telephonically on March 8, 2012.
Counsel for Plaintiff appeared at the hearing telephonically. Counsel for Defendant Fairfield,
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Attorney Bartlett, did not appear at the hearing. The reporter's transcript on appeal details the
court's consideration of the matter at the hearing as follows:
THE COURT: Well, what the court has before it is a motion for summary
judgment. Mr. Bartlett filed a motion to continue the summary judgment based
upon a tragic set of events that occurred some time ago.
And then there was an objection to the motion to continue the summary
judgment. And then the court received yesterday a response to the objection to
the defendant's motion to continue, and I had thought Mr. Bartlett would either
call in or be present.
The-in this particular case, this motion at this point in time is not-there
have been no affidavits submitted in opposition, nor has there been a brief
submitted in opposition to the motion for summary judgment.
I wanted to hear a little more detail from Mr. Bartlett regarding his request
to continue the motion. He is not present and has not made arrangements for
Court Call as set out in the court's notice of procedures for telephonic appearance
on March 6th that was sent to Mr. Bartlett's address at 722--or e-mailed to him.
THE CLERK: I e-mailed it to him.
THE COURT: Emailed it to him. And my clerk has indicated she emailed that.
And did it appear that the message had gone through?
"undeliverable"?

It didn't say

THE CLERK: I e-mailed it to all parties, soTHE COURT: You got the e-mail, too, did you, Mr. Witherspoon?
MR. ELLINGSEN: Yeah. Yeah I did. Mr. Ellingsen. Yeah.
THE COURT: Or Mr. Ellingsen. I'm sorry.
Well, I guess there's always potentially relief that he can pursue under
Rule 11 for reconsideration. But I am satisfied that there is no material issue of
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fact. You've demonstrated that the amount is due and payable; that the defendant,
Fairfield, was served.
There has been substantial time since Mr. Bartlett's-the issue regarding
his family and the tragedy that befell him. And I can't find, then, from the record
before the court, that there's a basis or good cause for continuing the motion for
summary judgment. There is no-as I said, no issue of fact. The law is clear.
The court, then, will grant the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment.
Tr. Vol. 1, p. 2, LL. 3-25 & p. 3, LL. 1-21.
Regarding extensions of time in which to respond to a motion for summary judgment,
I.R.C.P. 56(c) provides in pertinent part that the court may alter or shorten the time periods and
requirements for this rule for good cause shown, may continue the hearing, and may impose
costs, attorney's fees and sanctions against a party or the party's attorney, or both.
A motion for an extension of time to file additional affidavits, depositions, and
interrogatories in opposition to a motion for summary judgment lies within the discretion of the
district court and won't be overturned unless there is a finding that the district court abused its
discretion in denying the motion for an extension. Bennett v. Bliss, 103 Idaho 358 (Idaho App.
1982).
In fact, this case is somewhat similar to the issue the Supreme Court faced in Johnston v.

Pascoe, 100 Idaho 414 (1979). In this case, Johnston had filed a motion for summary judgment
on December 5, 1974. On February 14, 1975, Pascoe filed a memorandum in opposition to the
motion for summary judgment. On March 4, 1975, Pascoe moved the court for an extension of
time within which to file additional affidavits, depositions and interrogatories, which was
opposed by Johnston. Ultimately, on March 12, 1975, the trial court entered its memorandum
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decision denying the motion for extension of time and ruling that Johnston was entitled to
summary judgment. Pascoe, thereafter filed an appeal and the matter was considered by the
Supreme Court.

In deciding the matter, the Idaho Supreme Court noted that there was no affidavit in the
record explaining why the information sought could not have been sooner found and presented to
the trial court. The Supreme Court found that under the facts and circumstances presented to the
trial court, the Supreme Court could not find that the district court had abused its discretion in
denying the motion. Regarding an appellate review of this type of issue, the Johnston court
noted: "In Lasher v. Krasse/t, 96 Idaho 854, 857, 538 P. 2d 783, 786 (1975), this court stated
regarding abuse of discretion by a trial court:"
We decline to ascribe a definitive meaning to the amorphous phrase
"abuse of discretion" (citations omitted) solely for the purposes of this case, but it
will suffice to say, that where the trial court has exercised such discretion after a
careful consideration of the relevant factual circumstances and principles of law,
and without arbitrary disregard for those facts and principles of justice, we will
not disturb that action.
Id at 419.

Similar to the Johnston case, it is clear from the record that the district court

considered the affidavit of Robert Bartlett in support of motion to continue and the content
therein when the district court ultimately denied the request for a continuance. The portion of
the Reporter's Transcript cited above details the due consideration the district court gave to
Defendant Fairfield's motion for a continuance. The district court noted that Attorney Bartlett
had filed the motion to continue based upon a tragic set of events that occurred some time ago.
But, as the Reporter's Transcript bears out, the district court noted that there was insufficient
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information provided in support of the motion to continue to explain why such a substantial
amount of time had passed regarding Mr. Bartlett's family tragedy which warranted another
continuance. Furthermore, Mr. Bartlett failed to attend the hearing to provide more detail as to
why additional time was warranted. Based upon the foregoing, the district court concluded that
it could not find good cause for continuing the motion for summary judgment any further.
Similar to the District Court's ruling in Johnston v. Pascoe, the District Court did not abuse its
discretion when it found that good cause was lacking and when it denied Defendant Fairfield's
motion for a continuance of the summary judgment hearing.

ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

I.

PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ITS ATTORNEY'S FEES AND
COSTS ON APPEAL PURSUANT TO IDAHO APPELLATE RULE 41, IDAHO
CODE§ 12-120(3), I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l) AND PURSUANT TO THE TERMS OF THE
UNDERLYING GUARANTEE.
The District Court was clearly correct in awarding Plaintiff its attorney's fees and costs

pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120(3). In the event Plaintiff prevails on this appeal, it respectfully
submits that pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120(3), the underlying guarantee, I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l);
and Idaho Appellate Rule 41, that an award to it of its attorney's fees and costs on appeal is
appropriate.
Idaho Appellate Rule 41(a) provides: "Any party seeking attorney's fees on appeal must
assert such a claim as an issue presented on appeal in the first appellate brief filed by such party
as provided by Rules 35(a)(5) and 35(b)(5) .... " Pursuant to this Rule, Plaintiff has properly
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identified its request in this brief (Plaintiffs first appellate brief) as an additional issue on appeal.
Accordingly, Plaintiff is entitled to an award of said attorney's fees and costs on appeal based
upon the following authority:
Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) provides:
In any civil action to recover on an open account, account stated, note, bill,
negotiable instrument, guaranty or contract related to the purchase or sale of
goods, wares, merchandise, or services and in any commercial transaction unless
otherwise provided by law, the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable
attorney's fee to be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs.
Further, the underlying guarantee which was executed by Defendant Fairfield provides
that Defendant Fairfield agreed to pay Plaintiffs attorney's fees and costs incurred by Plaintiff in
the event of default by Defendant Fairfield. R. Vol. 1, p. 22, LL. 11-19. Specifically, the
guarantee attached as Exhibit C to the Affidavit of Jason Delp provides:
Attorneys' Fees; Expenses. Guarantor agrees to pay upon demand all of
Lender's costs and expenses, including Lender's reasonable attorneys' fees and
Lender's legal expenses, incurred in connection with the enforcement of this
Guaranty. Lender may hire or pay someone else to help enforce this Guaranty,
and Guarantor shall pay the costs and expenses of such enforcement. Costs and
expenses include Lender's reasonable attorneys' fees and legal expenses whether
or not there is a lawsuit, including reasonable attorneys' fees and legal expenses
for bankruptcy proceedings(including efforts to modify or vacate any automatic
stay or injunction), appeals, and any anticipated post-judgment collection
services. Guarantor also shall pay all court costs and such additional fees as may
be directed by the court.
R. Vol. l,p. 37.
Additionally, I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l) provides:
In any civil action the court may award reasonable attorney fees, which at the
discretion of the court may include paralegal fees, to the prevailing party or
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parties as defined in Rule 54(d)(l)(B), when provided for by any statute or
contract.
In sum, it is clear from Idaho Code § 12-120(3) and the expressed terms of the guarantee
executed by Defendant Fairfield, that in the event Plaintiff prevails upon this appeal, that
Plaintiff is entitled to an award of its reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred in this appeal.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff requests that this Court affirm the decision rendered by
the district court in granting Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment. Defendant Fairfield has
failed to establish that the District Court abused its discretion in denying Defendant Fairfield's
motion to continue the summary judgment hearing. Further, in response to Plaintiffs motion for
summary judgment, Defendant Fairfield failed to present any evidence disputing the facts
presented by Plaintiff. Due to an absence of any disputed material facts, the district court's
decision to grant Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment was clearly proper pursuant to
I.R.C.P. 56(c). As a prevailing party on this appeal, Plaintiff requests that this Court grant
Plaintiffs reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred in this appeal.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

2,t;' day of January, 2013.

Mark A. Ellingsen, ISB No. 4720
WITHERSPOON KELLEY
The Spokesman Review Building
608 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 300
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814-2146
Attorneys for Sterling Savings Bank
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on t h i s ~day of January, 2013, I caused two true and correct
copies of the foregoing RESPONDENT'S BRIEF to be served by the method indicated below,
and addressed to the following:
Robert A. Bartlett, ISB No. 5794
LAW OFFICES OF ROBERT A. BARTLETT
P.O. Box 587
St. Maries, ID 83861
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